Les cahiers de recherche du CREATE ne font pas l'objet d'un processus d'évaluation par les pairs/CREATE working papers do not undergo a peer review process.
2 sensitive products, 4 for which countries are not obliged to apply negotiated tariff reductions.
Minimum access should then be increased to compensate for the lesser reduction of tariffs. 5 The study of the consequences of an increase in minimum access and therefore levels of optimality in terms of producer surplus, consumer surplus and global welfare is therefore pertinent.
The prevalence of import quotas in several countries and various economic sectors 6 has spawned rich literature on this question, including recent works by Chao and Yu (1991), Feenstra (1995) , Maggie and Rodriguez-Clare (2000) , Kreickmeier (2005) and Chao et al. (2010) . In the agri-food sector specifically, several studies have analyzed the impact of import quotas on a country's welfare using modeling approaches of varying complexity. Gervais and Lapan (2001) perform a dynamic analysis of the effects of tariff rate quotas, whereas Gervais and Lapan (2002) introduce uncertainty in their model. Pouliot and Larue (2012) consider the segments of production, processing and retail. These authors show that an increase in TRQs defined as a fraction of internal production can lead to an increase in retailers' internal prices if the price of imports is between the unit production cost and firms' internal price upstream. Larue, Gervais and Pouliot (2008) analyze a situation in which local production is controlled by a monopoly (e.g.
agricultural marketing board) with the possibility of restricting local producers' supply. The authors show that at high price levels, the increase in minimum access commitments is the preferred trade policy option. 4 See the WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_e.htm . Accessed September 4, 2013. 5 See draft text at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm. Accessed September 3, 2013.
6 See WTO site at http://tariffanalysis.wto.org/report/TariffQuotas.aspx for the agricultural sector. This situation was also observed in other economic sectors. Deardorff and Stern (1999, tables 3.1 and 3.2) report that in 1993, in the United States all non-tariff barriers and quotas (as measured by frequency ratios) were 22.9% and 18.1% respectively, for all products. The corresponding figures for the European Union were 23.7% and 17.2%.
In both Canada and the European Union, import management involves not only allocating imports under minimum access to different provinces/countries, but also controlling production to guarantee a sufficiently high domestic price. National production is allocated to different regions/countries, each of which should source mainly on its local market. In Canada, supply management bodies have thus been put in place to ensure effective allocation of production quotas between provinces and avoid interprovincial "trade wars. (Krugman, 1989) .
In the European Union, several import quota management systems coexist (WTO, 2013) . For some production, they are reassigned to different countries and import permits are consequently managed by importers in these states. 9 For other production, import quotas are managed according to the first-come first-served principle or on a historical basis. For the European Union, it is therefore important not only to be able to determine the optimal minimum access level, but also optimal national assignments of imports eligible for the minimum access system. This paper is based on the bilateral dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983) . Our analysis innovates by applying the concept of bilateral dumping to interregional trade and by analyzing the impact of minimum access levels on the welfare of different regions.
We derive the conditions under which it is optimal to observe interregional trade and those for which trade does not exist. The central message of our paper is that even if countries that have made minimum access commitments allow their production between regions such that trade is strictly minimized, it can still be optimal to observe interregional trade. World price and differing marginal production costs between regions play an important role here. "Artificial" barriers to trade between different regions/countries reduce global welfare. For a low (high) world price, the 5 minimum access level maximizing permit holders' rent will be higher (lower) than the minimum access level maximizing global welfare. Further, the greater (lesser) the marginal cost asymmetry between regions, the higher (lower) the maximum world price for which the optimal level of minimum access of permit holders compared with the price that maximizes global welfare. Also, when the most efficient region exports to the least efficient region and not the inverse, marginal production costs asymmetry, transaction costs and the world price determine whether the smaller or the larger region will obtain the largest share of import permits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and in section 3 we analyze the situation in which minimum access level is optimal, and allocations of national production are such that interregional trade exists. Section 4 defines the conditions under which only one region exports to the other region, whereas Section 5 describes conditions under which there is no bilateral dumping. 10 Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model
Let us assume a model with two regions, 1, 2 i  ; belonging to a single country plus the rest of the world. To satisfy a certain demand for a good, the country may import this good at international price w p plus the applied tariff, or it can produce it locally in both regions. We assume that the country adopts a minimum access import system M distributed between the two regions such that:
(1) 10 We do not present three other possibilities, namely that where: (i) the producer in region 2 acts as a monopoly on the market of each region; (ii) the producer in region 2 acts as a monopoly on the market of its region, and sales of the two regions are zero on the market of region 1; and (iii) nothing is produced locally. These results are available upon request. 
Where the variable z i represents the quantity demanded in region i. According to constraint (3), each region i must ensure that the quantity demanded locally does not exceed the sales of both regions plus the import volume permitted under minimal minimum access. Constraint (4) 11 This is the case of most products under supply management in Canada, for example, given that a very large portion of imports come from the United States. ensures for each region i that the sum of the quantity sold locally and that sold in the second region cannot exceed local production.
Let us assume a representative consumer with an additively separable utility function defined over a continuum of goods indexed by  , which varies along the unit interval:
. We then assume that the utility function is:
Where   z  is the individual's demand in sector  . Utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint and so the first-order conditions give the inverse demand functions for each region.
Following Neary (2003) and Neary and Tharakan (2012) , we assume that each sub-utility function is quadratic:
Considering only one good, the inverse demand functions and the marginal utility of income are:
Where the parameter p is the price, p  is the mean of prices and We assume that the two regions engage in bilateral dumping. They compete à la Cournot on the market of each region. The inverse demand that they face in region i is therefore denoted as:
The game is played in two steps. In the first step, the country selects the minimum access level that maximizes the total welfare of both regions. The welfare of each region is the sum of the producer and consumer surplus and import permit holders' rent. In the second step, each region determines the sales that maximize its profits, and therefore the total quantity produced.
The problem is solved using backward induction, and is presented in the following section.
Optimality of the minimum access level in a bilateral trade context
The profit maximization program of the producer in region 1 that sells its product in both regions is:
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The first-order condition of the maximization problem given by (10) is:
Equation (11) lets us obtain the reaction functions of the producer in region 1:
Similarly, for the producer in region 2, we obtain
simultaneously solving all of the reaction functions, we determine the solutions of 1 j t and 2 j t
given by:
According to (12), sales depend negatively on minimum access level. An increase in minimum access lowers the demand that the local producer faces, which decreases sales. Further, sales from one of the regions to the other region depend on the degree of production cost asymmetry measured by the parameter . We have assumed that region 2 is more efficient. An improvement in production efficiency in region 2 favors an increase in local sales in this region ( 
In the problem defined by equation (13), the functional form of the utility function is given by equation (6). The first-order condition is:
By solving (14), it is possible to determine the optimal minimum access level for region i:
According to (15), the region with a larger market will receive a larger portion of the import under the minimum access commitment.
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The optimal minimum access level of the country is the sum of the minimum access of both regions: 
Based on (17), we can deduce the most restrictive conditions on This result is summarized by proposition 1, the proof of which is found in Appendix 1. We will now examine the effect on welfare of the increase in minimum access.
Proposition 1.

Let
17 Figure 3 shows that the total welfare in both regions increases as the minimum access in each region rises to the optimal level. Beyond the optimal minimum access level, total welfare decreases until it reaches a level that corresponds to minimum access levels max 1 M and max 2
M . The variation in welfare depends on the variation in producer and consumer surplus, along with permit holders' rent.
The impact of minimum access on the producer surplus is illustrated in Figure 4 . An increase in minimum access in region 1 decreases the demand that the local producer faces, which lowers the price and quantity produced, and consequently decreases the producer's surplus. Further, an increase in minimum access level in region 2 reduces the sales of region 1 on the market of region 2. This decrease in sales lowers the producer surplus and the welfare of region 1. Figure 5 shows the impact of minimum access on consumer surplus. An increase in minimum access decreases the price paid by consumers, and consequently improves their welfare.
We analyze in greater detail the impact of minimum access level on import permit holders' rent and the level of welfare in region 1. The results are presented in the following proposition, the proof of which appears in Appendix 2. 

According to proposition 2, there is a level of world price for which the interests of import permit holders coincide with the objective of maximizing total welfare (condition (iii)). Figure 6 illustrates the impact of the increase in minimum access in both regions on permit holders' rent (PHR1) and welfare (W1) of region 1, for different intervals of world price. M level, the decrease in producer surplus and permit holders' rent is greater than the increase in consumer surplus; total welfare thus decreases in region 1.
Exporting from the most efficient to the least efficient region
Now, we examine the situation where the producer from region 2 acts like a monopoly on the market of its region and competes à la Cournot on the market of region 1. We therefore have 
The solutions to the problem must satisfy conditions (20) and (21), which give us the conditions for which there is unilateral interregional trade from region 2 to region 1, whereas the inverse is not true. This result is explained in Corollary 2.
under the minimum access system. 18 In the case of symmetrical demand   1   , the region with the lowest marginal cost will have a smaller share of imports.
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Concluding remarks
The prevalence of import quotas in several countries and different economic sectors has generated rich literature. In Canada and the European Union, import management under tariffrate quotas not only entails assigning eligible imports under the minimum access commitment to different provinces/countries, but also production control to guarantee a sufficiently high domestic price level. National production is allocated to different regions, each of which must mainly supply on its local market. However, the data on exchanges between provinces/countries show that in several cases, producers do not supply local markets exclusively. In Canada, this has led to conflicts between provincial administration bodies of productions under supply management, and to attempts to put in place trade barriers between provinces, which contradicts the current trend of encouraging a reduction in domestic trade barriers.
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This paper is based on the bilateral dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983) in which trade can exist even in the absence of a comparative advantage of a given region. Reciprocal dumping is the outcome of a non-cooperative game that enhances competition while creating sourcing inefficiencies because increases in consumption are supported by purchases subject to transport costs.
18 Based on equations (31) 
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We derive the conditions under which it is optimal to observe interregional trade and those under which trade does not exist. World price and differing production costs between regions are very influential here. In the presence of bilateral trade, the region with the largest market size will obtain the largest share of import volumes permitted under the minimum access system. When only the most efficient region exports to the least efficient region, world price, production cost asymmetry and transaction costs also play important roles in the issuing of import permits. The larger economy will not necessarily receive the largest volume of import permits. In the absence of interregional trade, the distribution of import permits between regions depends on the product cost asymmetry parameters and market size.
In terms of public policy, our results imply that even if in general countries that make minimum access commitments allocate their production between regions such that trade is strictly minimized, it is not optimal to create trade barriers between regions/countries. "Artificial" trade barriers between different regions/countries will contribute to reducing the welfare of at least one of the regions, along with global welfare. Without these barriers, world price and productivity gains observed in different regions would determine efficient adjustments to trade flows between regions/countries. 
